The African Union (AU)
Context
As the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
founded in 1963, was established as a loose association of African
states with limited mechanisms for implementing coordinated regional
policies, managing conflicts and fostering continental peace and
security, it experienced fundamental challenges to its raison d'être.
Among these challenges – and arguably the most limiting challenge – was
the decision to maintain an inviolable respect for a Westphalian
conception of state sovereignty. This essentially meant that in order
for the OAU to function at all it had to rely heavily on the political
will of member states. The OAU’s limited Charter, together with its
failure to stem the tide of civil wars and emerging dictatorships,
eventually overburdened the institution, and in 2002 the African Union
(AU) was established as its successor. The AU, while retaining much of
the ideology of its predecessor, would be created with an eye to
addressing shortcomings of the OAU while still promoting continental
unity and a united front for Africa.U.S.
President, Barack Obama, addresses the AU about Africa’s trend towards
incumbent presidents and unconstitutional third-terms in office. Source:
japantimes.co.jp
Goals and Guiding Principles
Thus, the age-old goal of pan-Africanism
had not entirely faded as the AU’s Constitutive Act came into force in
2001, with the Act making reference to the fact that it was “inspired by
the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers. . .and generations
of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity,
cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African
States.” Thus, the objectives of the AU enshrined in the Constitutive
Act includes fostering solidarity and respecting sovereignty, but also
includes the promotion of socio-economic development, peace and
security, democracy and good governance, human rights, sustainable
development and global cooperation. In this regard, the AU’s
Constitutive act represents a significant departure from the OAU which
aimed to eradicate colonialism but made no mention of democracy and
human rights.
Structure: Organs of the AU
The Assembly, comprising of Heads
of State and Government, acts as the supreme organ of the AU and meets
annually. The Assembly is responsible for determining common policies,
membership, and the establishment of institutions. The responsibility
of deciding on matters of intervention rests with the Assembly. In
comparison to the OAU, the AU Assembly possesses legal capacities to
impose sanctions on members who do not comply with AU policies.
Heads of State attend the 24th AU Summit in Addis Ababa, 2015. Source: developmentdiaries.com/
The Executive Council, comprised
of foreign ministers, is tasked with determining policies of common
interest to member states such as trade, industry, resources,
infrastructure and science and technology. Decisions are taken through a
two-thirds member state majority.
The AU Commission is the third
organ of the AU, appointed by the AU Assembly to act as a secretariat to
the Assembly, preparing documents and agendas.
Inaugurated in March 2004, the Pan African Parliament
was established to act as an oversight body to the executive functions,
and to ensure grassroots participation and input of civil society (CSO)
and non-governmental organisations (NGO). While the intention is for
the PAP to become a fully legislative body, at present it is only able
to exercise advisory powers through making recommendations and promoting
the collective aims of the AU.
One further oversight mechanism is
ECOSOCC, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, which consists of
150 representatives of social and professional civil society groups, is
intended to provide civil society with a voice to influence AU
policymaking.
Permanent representatives of AU member
states form the Permanent Representatives’ Committee, which is
responsible for preparing work of the executive and acting as an
advisory body. The Representatives also facilitate dialogue between
member state capitals and the AU Commission.
The AU further makes use of Specialised
Technical Committees which are involved in the preparation and oversight
of projects relevant to their areas of specialisation. The Technical
Committees are comprised of seven committees with unlimited membership,
including committees on agriculture, finance, trade and immigration,
science and technology, transport and infrastructure, health, and
education.
The provision for a Court of Justice was
adopted in 1998 and established via Article 1 of the Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and People’s rights. The jurisdiction of the
court extends to cases submitted which involve the interpretation and
implementation of the Protocol, and can include interstate disputes and
the defence of human rights. Thus far, only 26 states have ratified the
Protocol.
AU Chairwoman, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, meets with United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon. Source: .peaceau.org
Equally important for ensuring civilian protection and political stability is the Peace and Security Council,
which entered into force in December 2003 through the Protocol Relating
to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union. The PSC
includes fifteen member states and is tasked with maintaining and
promoting peace and stability on the continent. The PSC is thus a tool
for collective security, acting as a continental early warning mechanism
for crisis response. The PSC is therefore responsible for determining
the viability of peacekeeping missions and interventions in member
states under Article 4.
Achievements
Democracy and Good Governance
Unlike its predecessor, the AU has taken
initiative to promote democracy and good governance. Its Constitutive
Act states the AU’s aim, under Article 3(g), to “promote democratic
principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance,”
and nearly all institutions and organs of the AU reflect this goal.
Given that the OAU was perceived by many
as a ‘dictator’s club’ unable and unwilling to counter unconstitutional
changes of government and authoritarianism, the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) is a further step in the right direction for the AU.
The APRM is mandated to ensure Member States’ compliance with AU
policies, but also as a means of creating a means of reviewing
democratic, governance and human rights records of member states, by
member states.
South African president, Jacob Zuma (right of center), stands next to fellow heads-of-state at an AU. meeting Source: siliconafrica.com
Established as a means to correct the
flaws in its predecessor, the AU has reconsidered its objectives to
reflect the concerns of postcolonial Africa. Among those concerns was
the imperative to counter low economic growth brought about by
over-reliance on neocolonial trade with America and Europe through
establishing intra-continental trade which would, theoretically,
strengthen Africa’s entry into the global economic system. The AU has
thus shifted its focus paradigmatically from state-centric economic
control towards the goal of inter-African trade with the inclusion of
the private sector.
The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the brainchild of former South African President Thabo Mbeki,
has been instrumental in assisting economic integration as well as
Africa’s entry into the global economy from which it has been
perpetually excluded and marginalised. As an instrument of the AU,
NEPAD was adopted in 2001 by African heads of state with the core
objectives of poverty eradication, the promotion of sustainable growth
and development, and the empowerment of women. With unacceptably high
levels of poverty and underdevelopment, NEPAD was designed to aid Africa
in its Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s). While a number of these
goals, including the promotion of women, healthcare and universal
primary education have improved, others, such as the reduction of
poverty and hunger, have been slow to progress.
Peace and Security
A further point of departure – one which
has been a source of inspiration for much academic discourse – has been
the move away from the principle of Westphalian non-interference in the
affairs of member states towards a stance of ‘non-indifference.’
Article 4 of the Constitutive Act indicates a major shift from the OAU
which stressed state sovereignty, to the enshrined ability of the AU to
intervene in a member state under grave circumstances. Of particular
import is Article 4(h) and more recently, 4(j) which allows for AU
intervention under the circumstances of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and affords member states the power to request
intervention in order to restore peace and security.
Furthermore, unlike the OAU, the AU’s
inclusion of a PSC and the subsequent provision for crisis response and
management has granted the possibility for an ‘African solution to
African problems’ approach. With Article 4(h) and the PSC, the AU is
far more empowered to address the continent’s many conflicts and
instabilities. However, while the legal framework exists, political
will continues to hamper and drive calls for intervention.
Nevertheless, the AU in partnership with
international bodies such as the UN has made strides towards managing
the multiple conflicts and insurgencies in Africa. Notably, the AU has
played a major role in mitigating post/electoral violence in Kenya and
the Ivory Coast, and has undertaken a number of hybrid missions together
with the UN. The AU frequently sends observer missions to monitor
elections in member states under the African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Good Governance (2007).
AU Headquarters, built by China in Ethiopia’s capital of Addis Ababa (2012) Source: siliconafrica.com
The AU’s self-appointed ability to
intervene in the sovereign affairs of a member state under Article 4(h)
has arguably afforded the organisation a far more pragmatic means of
addressing the continent’s numerous inter and intrastate conflicts. It
has also, however – particularly with the inclusion of 4(j) which allows
member states to request intervention in their own state or in another –
become point of contention as states struggle to relinquish their
conceptual grip on sovereignty. The addition of the AU’s objectives of
ensuring democracy and good governance does not sit well with some who
consider 4(h) and 4(p) to be a means for the AU to meddle in sovereign
affairs and instigate regime change. Per contra, the fact that member
states may request AU intervention has attracted criticism that heads of
state may waive the intervention flag in an attempt to maintain a hold
on power in the event of civil uprising against repressive authoritarian
regimes, or in an attempt to destabilise or force regime change in
another state. According to the PSC Protocol, a member state which is
part of the PSC may not engage in decision-making or discussion on
matters of intervention in that state. However, as illustrated by
Sudan’s obstruction of decision-making on the Darfur issue, and by
Ethiopia which was party to PSC discussions on the Somalian conflict (in
which Ethiopia was involved), the Protocol is not strictly adhered to
which calls into question the PSC’s impartiality.
One further shortcoming in the AU’s
Constitutive Act is that while Article 4 affords the AU with
intervention powers, it makes no mention of the United Nations Security
Council’s (UNSC) endorsement of interventions, thus bypassing the UN
Charter which stipulates, under Article 53, that no state may undertake
intervention without the explicit authorisation of the Security
Council. This implies the potential for tensions between the UN and the
AU, particularly in light of the UN’s reluctance on the issues of
intervention and the use of force (which are not unwarranted, given the
disastrous unfolding of interventions in Rwanda, Srebrenica and
Somalia).
Unfortunately, despite the existence of
the APRM and the AU Member States’ theoretical commitment to democracy
and good governance, Africa has since seen several violations of
constitutions, electoral fraud, human rights abuses and the suppression
of civil and political rights. Most recently illustrated by the Arab
Spring, the crisis in Darfur, pre-electoral political instability in
Burundi and Kenya, and the relapse of violence in the Central African
Republic in 2013, the AU has clearly struggled to execute its
self-imposed mandate of facilitating democracy, good governance, peace
and stability. Many African countries lack basic separation of powers
as power is centralised in the executive (Zimbabwe), which allows for
the ruling party to maintain dominance, dominate state resources and
place those loyal to the regime in places of power. Judicial
independence is thus rendered problematic and corruption is endemic.
The standard uniform for AU troops contributed by member states (AMISOM troops deployed to Somalia) Source: africatime.com
Thus, the APRM may provide the blueprint
for addressing corruption and poor governance, but the fact that
membership and reviews are voluntary again leaves its efficacy in the
hands of political will and Heads of State who must make the decision to
comply with international laws and regulations. A number of AU member
states have as of yet failed to sign and ratify the objectives of NEPAD,
which is required for the APRM to perform its duty. This, together with
the APRM’s lack of inclusiveness of civil society has led to criticisms
of the APRM as a ‘toothless’ body.
Major Impediments
As with the OAU, funding and resources
has been a perpetual bane of the AU, which requires finances to fund the
operationalisation of its institutions and the fulfilment of its
mandate to promote peace and security. To this end, the AU’s Peace Fund
draws on appropriations from within its budget, voluntary member state
contributions, and voluntary contributions from within and outside of
the continent. Member states are required to pay membership fees, which
is often impossible due to the poor state of most African states’
economies. While the EU has been an invaluable source of funding for
the AU, reliance on external aid renders the AU susceptible to outside
interference and restrictions (for example, when the AU requires funding
for a peace operation, it must first seek the permission of the EU
Commission and the EU Political and Security Committee).
While the OAU has attempted to address
the need for peace and security on the continent through the notion of a
security community, it has thus far failed to do so adequately due to
the lack of regional integration on the continent. Economic integration
– required for effective regional integration - has fared poorly due to
a number of reasons such as foreign aid dependency, a lack of political
will, overlapping mandates of regional economic blocs and a lack of
financial and human resources. While regional economic communities
(RECs)
Clearly, Africa’s many conflicts
severely inhibits attempts at integration and collective security.
These conflicts drain state resources, threaten political stability and
result in human rights abuses and humanitarian crises on a massive scale
which disables state cooperation and development.
Thus, while the AU is a major
improvement – both legislatively and structurally – on the OAU, a number
of significant challenges remain. The AU’s regional economic
integration initiative is arguably the most significant challenge as
well as the most urgent, which will require a paradigmatic shift in the
way governments conceptualise sovereignty. Political will acts as a
further impediment to the achievement of the AU mandate, particularly as
the AU lacks significant authority to enforce member compliance.
Nevertheless, the African continent – civil society in particular – has
demonstrated (as in the case of Burundi’s recent electoral violence and
the Arab Springs) the desire for strong, accountable and transparent
institutions, governments and democracy. In the spirit of optimism,
perhaps this desire will catch fire and spur the AU to shun complacency
and continue to promote good governance, the rule of law and the active
participation of civil society.
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