Philosophy of history
Philosophy of history, the
study either of the historical process and its development or of the
methods used by historians to understand their material.
The term history
may be employed in two quite different senses: it may mean (1) the
events and actions that together make up the human past, or (2) the
accounts given of that past and the modes of investigation whereby they
are arrived at or constructed. When used in the first sense, the word
refers to what as a matter of fact happened, while when used in the second sense it refers to the study and description of those happenings (see also historiography).
The notion of philosophical reflection upon history
and its nature is consequently open to more than one interpretation,
and modern writers have found it convenient to regard it as covering two
main types of undertaking. On the one hand, they have distinguished philosophy
of history in the traditional or classical sense; this is conceived to
be a first-order enquiry, its subject matter being the historical
process as a whole and its aim being, broadly speaking, one of providing
an overall elucidation or explanation
of the course and direction taken by that process. On the other hand,
they have distinguished philosophy of history considered as a
second-order enquiry. Here attention is focused not upon the actual
sequence of events themselves but, instead, upon the procedures and
categories used by practicing historians in approaching and
comprehending their material. The former, often alluded to as speculative philosophy of history, has had a long and varied career; the latter, which is generally known as critical or analytical philosophy of history, did not rise to prominence until the 20th century.
Speculative theories
The idea of an order or design in history
The
belief that it is possible to discern in the course of human history
some general scheme or design, some all-encompassing purpose or pattern,
is very old and has found expression in various forms at different
times and places. The reasons for its persistence and vitality are
numerous, but two very general considerations may be identified as
having exercised a fairly continuous influence. First, it has often been
supposed that, if the belief in an overall pattern is abandoned, one is
obliged to acquiesce
in the view that the historical process consists of no more than an
arbitrary succession of occurrences, a mere agglomeration or patchwork
of random incidents and episodes. But such a view (it has been
contended) cannot be seriously entertained, if only because it conflicts
with the basic demand for system and order that underlies and governs
all rational enquiry, all meaningful thought about the world. Second, it
has frequently been felt that to refuse to allow that history is
finally intelligible in the required manner implies a skepticism concerning the value of human life and existence that constitutes an affront to the dignity of human nature. The 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, for example, spoke of the “repugnance” that is inevitably experienced if the past is viewed
as if the whole web of human history were woven out of folly and childish vanity and the frenzy of destruction, so that one hardly knows in the end what idea to form of our race, for all that it is so proud of its prerogatives.
In more recent times, a comparable attitude was discernible beneath Arnold Toynbee’s uncompromising repudiation of the idea that history is “a chaotic, disorderly, fortuitous
flux, in which there is no pattern or rhythm of any kind to be
discerned.” Thus, it has been the object of a long line of theorists,
representative of widely divergent outlooks, to demonstrate that such
pessimism is unjustified and that the historical process can, when
appropriately viewed, be seen to be both rationally and morally
acceptable.
Arnold Toynbee, 1974Courtesy of Oxford University Press; photograph, Fay Goodwin
Theological origins
Western speculation concerning the meaning of history derived in the first instance chiefly from theological sources. The belief that history conforms to a linear development in which the influence of providential wisdom can be discerned, rather than to a recurrent cyclical movement of the kind implicit
in much Greco-Roman thought, was already becoming prevalent early in
the Common Era. Traces of this approach are to be found in the conception of the past developed in the 4th century by St. Augustine in his De civitate Dei (City of God)
and elsewhere; it is, for example, compared on one occasion to “the
great melody of some ineffable composer,” its parts being “the
dispensations suitable to each different period.” Yet the cautious
subtlety of Augustine’s suggestions and the crucial distinction he drew
between sacred and secular
history make it important not to confuse his carefully qualified
doctrines with the cruder positions advanced by some of his
self-proclaimed successors. This applies, par excellence, to the work of
the most renowned and thorough of these, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet. Written 1,250 years after Augustine’s death, Bossuet’s Discours sur l’histoire universelle (1681; Discourse on Universal History) is imbued throughout with a naïve confidence that the entire course of history owes its pervasive
character to the contrivance of a “higher wisdom.” In the eyes of
Bossuet, to grasp and understand the great procession of empires and
religions was “to comprehend in one’s mind all that is great in human
affairs and have the key to the history of the universe.” For the rise
and fall of states and creeds depended in the end upon the secret orders
of Providence, the latter being the source of that manifest historical justice and retribution
to which, on nearly every page, the annals of the past bore clear and
unmistakable witness. Bossuet’s vast survey was, in fact, the last major
contribution to its genre. Although it made a considerable impression when it was first published, it appeared just before the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton
effected a massive transformation of the European outlook, and the
book’s impact was short-lived. Thus, the development of historical
speculation in the 18th century was generally marked by a tendency to
reject theological and providential interpretations in favour of an
approach more closely aligned, in method and aim, to that adopted by
natural scientists in their investigations of the physical world.
More about philosophy of history
34 References found in Britannica Articles
relation to
- cyclic view of time (in time: Cyclic view of time in the philosophy of history)
- morphological classification of religions (in study of religion: The late 17th and 18th centuries) (in classification of religions: Morphological)
